Rodolfo Casadei
The recent events of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine have amazed many European observers for the high level of politicization that an eminently ecclesial affair has assumed and for the absolutely obvious ways in which this politicization has manifested itself. For a Western European today it is very difficult to imagine a head of state taking part in a Synod of bishops and identifying the destiny of the country he represents politically with that of its majority Church, and which identifies political independence and religious independence.
«FINALLY A CHURCH WITHOUT PUTIN»
Yet this is what happened in Kiev 15 last December with the Synod for the unification of the Ukrainian Church, not recognized and harshly condemned by the Moscow Patriarchate (on which until then the main Orthodox Church operating in Ukraine depended), blessed and approved in its canonical conclusions by the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew. President Petro Poroshenko said, present from the beginning to the end of the Synod's work, addressing the crowd outside the former Hagia Sophia church: «This day will remain in history as the sacred day of the creation of the autocephalous Local Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the day we finally receive our independence from Russia. (…) Ukraine will no longer drink Moscow poison from Moscow's cup".
While in the speech given at the opening of the Synod he had stated about the new Church that was about to be established: «It is a Church without Putin, it is a Church without the Patriarch of Moscow Kirill, it is a Church that does not pray for the Russian authorities and military forces. Why Russian power and Russian forces kill Ukrainians". In reality there is little to be surprised about, because the history of the Orthodox Churches has always been strongly linked to the national identity of the faithful, and therefore to the political events connected with these identities. And these are not dynamics of the past destined to vanish under the influence of modernization: religious faith is mainly an identity issue in Christian-Orthodox majority countries today. The statistics on religious beliefs and practices in Orthodox countries that have been compiled in recent years suggest this. From them we discover that the end of state atheism and anti-religious propaganda in Orthodox countries governed for decades by communist regimes has favored the reappearance of religious identities, but it did not lead to an increase in religious practice.
ADHERENCE TO THE FAITH GROWS
Nello studio “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe” del maggio 2017 of the authoritative Pew Research Institute we find that among the 1991 and the 2015 the percentage of adults who call themselves Orthodox Christians has increased since 37 al 71 percent in Russia, dal 59 al 75 percent in Bulgaria and since 39 al 78 percent in Ukraine. However, this impetuous doubling of adherence to religious faith in less than a quarter of a century does not correspond to significant rates of religious practice: they go to church at least once a week 5 percent of Bulgarians, il 6 percent of Russians, il 12 percent of Ukrainians. The European Orthodox country with the highest attendance rate is Romania, col 21 percent.
Completely different panorama among the Catholics of the central and eastern European countries that experienced communism: they attend church weekly on 54 percent of Bosnian Catholics, il 45 of those of Poland, il 43 percent of Greek Catholics in Ukraine, ecc.; they pray daily 15 percent of Bulgarians, il 17 percent of Russians, il 29 percent of Ukrainians (who "beat" the Polish Catholics, fermi al 27 percent).
To the question whether the Christian Orthodox faith is very or enough important to truly participate in the national identity, the Caucasus countries respond with massive percentages (Armenia 82 percent, Georgia 81 percent), but also in Russia and Ukraine this is the opinion of the majority respectively col 57 and the 51 percent.
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE REMAINS LOW
Even more interesting are the confirmations that come from the study on the religiosity of young Europeans (“Europe’s Young Adults and Religion”) made by St. Mary University of London, from the Benedict XVI Center for religion and society and from the Catholic Institute of Paris on the eve of the Synod on young people. From it we learn that the 49 percent of Russians among 16 and i 29 years does not identify with any religion: much less than among the British (70 percent) and the French (64 percent), not to mention Swedes (75 percent) and Dutch (72 percent). However, when we move on to topics such as participation in liturgies and personal prayer, things change profoundly, and the results of young Russians are not at all different from those of secularized European countries: only the 4 percent of young Russians go to church weekly, that is, less than the French (6 percent) and the British (7 percent); to pray on their own at least once a week are the 14 percent of young Russians, the same value found among young French people, a little worse than the British (18 percent) and the Germans (25 percent).
«A STRONG RUSSIA IS NECESSARY»
That the Orthodox Christian faith has unavoidable political implications can also be argued on the basis of a rather curious fact that the Pew Institute research highlights: the statement «a strong Russia is necessary to counterbalance the influence of the West» finds much consensus even in countries belonging to the European Union, but much more in the Orthodox ones than in the Catholic or Protestant ones. In fact, they agree with the statement 52 percent of Romanians, il 56 percent of Bulgarians and the 70 percent of Greeks; but only the 34 percent of Estonians, Lithuanians and Poles, il 40 percent of Latvians, il 44 percent of Hungarians, il 49 percent of Czechs.
Finally, it may come as a surprise to many to discover how little it is considered, in most Christian Orthodox countries, the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, who with his recent moves in the Ukrainian affair has provoked the ire of the Moscow Patriarchate which has broken communion with him: well before the breakup last October, only the 4 percent of Serbs and Russians considered him the highest Orthodox authority, il 7 percent of Ukrainians, 8 percent Bosnians, Belarusians, Bulgarians and Latvians. Only in Greece does Bartolomeo win the majority with 56 percent.
source – https://www.tempi.it/la-guerra-religiosa-tra-ucraina-e-russia/
The Christian church is no good anywhere ! Catholicism has popes who seem to be custodians of another religion that is no longer Catholic; furthermore they are sanctified in a short canonical process, so much to confirm the validity of the last Council which disintegrated the church. The Orthodox Church has always been linked to national particularisms and has been in collusion with these up to the Russian Orthodox bishops , during the time of the USSR, spie del KGB (to survive ?). The Protestant church, Let's not talk about it for goodness sake because it's in worse trouble than the other two. In short, it would take a proper earthquake or tsunami to shake everything up and clean it up….