We reached Giannicola Saldutti for an interview, doctor in foreign languages ​​and cultures, with particular knowledge of the Balkan area and beyond. He has already collaborated with In Terris, Sputnik, Geopolitics and Eurasian Business Dispatch and honed his skills by traveling between Belgrade and St. Petersburg.
You got to know Serbia closely, a country often opposed by the international community, which recently strengthened relations with Russia following the Putin-Vucic meeting. What are the historical and more current reasons that justify the closeness between the two countries?
The Russian-Serbian bond is something difficult to fully understand for those who experience the daily reality of some Eastern countries from the outside.. I myself, before living Belgrade, I could only sense the historical component, supported by elements that can be understood even by the most profane, like religious community, as well as the influence of a certain pan-Slavist ideology.
If from the outside all this may sound as romantic as it is far from reality, any attentive visitor could immediately realize how much Russia's "mission" is in Serbia (lately embodied in the figure of Putin, the archetypal strongman of the Russian political imagination) is truly in the hearts of the people. "The same color, true view” i.e. “same colours, same faith” the Serbs love to repeat, alluding to the colors of the flags of the two countries and the Orthodox brotherhood.
The feelings in Belgrade towards Moscow are so intense also because Serbia has always suffered from a sort of “abandonment syndrome” towards Europe: in the national narrative, It was precisely the Serbian sacrifice that allowed the European continent to resist the Ottoman invasions, in an East-West kulturkampf that forged the national identity of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenians.
Political proximity, diplomatic and military history between Moscow and Belgrade is well known, what is less known is the actual specific weight of this historical agreement placed within the worrying dynamics that are affecting the Balkans today. Although the Russian cultural influence in Serbia is always notable, from an economic and military point of view the numbers cannot yet be said to be relevant to consider Belgrade a true offshoot of Moscow.
The recent, albeit short and informal, rapprochement between Putin and Kosovar President Thaçi (we remember, not recognized by Russia) Serbia is very worried, increasingly politically isolated in the region, weighed down in its initiatives by the Kosovo issue, as well as the economic crisis.
In a nutshell, it is "easy" for Gazprom to finance the restoration works of the large Serbian Orthodox monasteries (as is happening with San Sava), as well as entering into important agreements with NišGaz for the transit of TurkStream. For Moscow, it is a completely different matter to actually invest de facto support Serbia in an operation to recover his old ambitions that is risky to say the least, given the geopolitical game being played in the Balkans.
Even today the Balkan area represents an important battlefield, where different geopolitical interests clash. How do you think the situation changed following the dissolution of Yugoslavia?: for better or for worse?
The dissolution of Yugoslavia undoubtedly contributed to weaken the economy of the various countries that have entered the international scene and are already victims of a recessionary phase since the death of Marshal Tito, as well as a fratricidal conflict that destroyed the production centers of the region. The process of "balkanization" of the area (objective never hidden by US high officials, as in the case of Brzezinski) it undoubtedly proved advantageous for the powers that still today place ambitions on the integration of the Balkans into Europe.
Both Zagreb and Belgrade, the main heirs of the Yugoslav experience, but, they have never shown in the last few 20 years of being able to really take off as lead countries, characterized by a weak economy, victims of a transaction towards the free market with very complex contours (as demonstrated by the Agrokor case, leading brand in the food supply sector in considerable difficulty). Croatia and Slovenia seem to have fallen into an indefinite Austro-German orbit, separated from Serbia (strategically increasingly surrounded by the NATO structures present in Croatia, albania e montenegro) via the buffer represented by Bosnia and Herzegovina.
To make the picture even more complex, the return of Ottomanism (often conveyed by religious extremism) recorded in the indigenous Muslim component and in the aspirations of the Albanian community both in Kosovo and in Macedonia, Country victim of a real identity crisis. The general impression, so, it's not the best: the recent Yugo-nostalgia, as well as a return to a nationalism understood in a negative sense, it is justified by a feeling of despondency widespread in the six Republics. It would be a serious mistake, for the West, get distracted and underestimate the current economic-social state of the region.
Lots of ethnic issues, religious and geographical are unresolved, lastly the "North Macedonia" affair. We must further expect a domino effect as has already occurred in historical precedents?
The recent Prespes agreement, which seems to have solved North Macedonia's dilemma, has as its ultimate aim the unblocking of a situation that has long contributed to ballasting the strategic policies of the southern Balkans: the controversy over the name of Macedonia FYROM. In this way, Skopje's entry into the structures Nato and in the EU it is free from obstacles. Via the Berlin Process, Western forces seem to want to assert a sphere of influence on the region before a Russia increasingly oriented towards the use of asymmetric and unconventional methods can do so.
It is no coincidence that Moscow appears to be the main force opposed to the ratification of the Treaty of Prespes. Many believe that the integration of the entire Balkan peninsula into NATO is the manna from heaven that will contribute to definitively stabilizing the region. I allow myself to go against the grain and draw a scenario considered by most to be unlikely: a Serbia completely surrounded by hostile military structures (even more so if NATO were to - which is probable- endorse Albanian demands in Kosovo) he could vent his frustration by inciting the Republika Srpska of Bosnia, going to alter the very fragile balance established in Dayton, a balance that could be accused of precariousness, but which at least guaranteed stability in a region where the intervention of the international community was necessary to stop the carnage.
Future stabilization passes through the continuous monitoring of a territorially mutilated Serbia, deprived of its ambitions and humiliated by an economic crisis that seems to have no end. The protests against Vučić do not seem to be decreasing, his image among Serbian public opinion is severely compromised (I have not infrequently heard Belgraders crudely brand the President as a "Western spy"), the ovation reserved for Putin sends a clear message: Belgrade is in strong search for redemption.
The humiliation received by the country during the commemorations of the First World War in Paris (with a Vučić ignored by world leaders, despite the blood shed by the Serbian people in the conflict 14-18), Montenegro in NATO, the Kosovar police force that becomes the army, the Gazivode trespass: if anyone has thought of resolving the Balkan question by definitively castrating Belgrade, they are committing a crime, in my opinion, a gross mistake that it could explode a situation that has already reached a good silent boiling point.
Allow me, Then, to express another consideration: everyone takes it for granted that compact membership of NATO will resolve conflicts and smooth out the rough edges of the Balkans by transforming historically rival countries into reasonable allies. The recent disagreements in the Aegean between Athens and Ankara, but, suggest the opposite. Two NATO members have not yet definitively resolved the issue regarding Cypriot sovereignty, while the latest changes at the head of the Greek Ministry of Defense betray growing tension. We are, so, very sure that an Albania integrated into NATO structures will give up its ambitions on Kosovo and Macedonia?
It is often ignored by the press that predatory economies are practiced in territories such as Kosovo, ranging from drug trafficking to organ trafficking without forgetting that these places represent a real hotbed of jihadists.

The Kosovo issue represents one of the most unique in the arena of contemporary international politics. At the moment, Pristina is the representation of military victory, Albanian politics and demographics in the area, victory fully endorsed by the United States of America. In unsuspecting times, former Secretary of State Margaret Albright made the following formula known: “what was done in Kosovo, honestly, it wasn't legal, but it was right".
This is rather strange as well dangerous interpretation of international law in the “American” way, adopted in a period of unchallenged unipolar dominance, it helped open a precedent that could prove problematic to say the least when brought into the multipolar world. It is no coincidence that many voices in Russian diplomatic circles have, in my opinion with good reason, mentioned Kosovo to legitimize what was done in Crimea in 2014.
It is not excluded that the singular "Albright formula" could create very serious problems for future world stability, in case it were applied by any other power (such as Russia in its near abroad or China in the Asia-Pacific) that it felt determined to do so to pursue its interests unilaterally through the use of force at a regional level.
In any case, Kosovo is now one consolidated reality with which Belgrade is forced to deal, in an exercise of realpolitik that has always been difficult for Serbian politics to execute. The stabilization of the Balkans, in my opinion, before any political-military integration, passes through the resolution of the Pristina-Belgrade diplomatic impasse (with Serbia officially recognizing Pristina and in exchange receiving control of the northern Serbian municipalities) and by a "clean-up" operation as well as serious restoration of the rule of law in Montenegro and Kosovo, where the power of the gangs and the level of smuggling and drug dealing activities reach worrying levels by regional standards.
The Western powers are making sure to give the Kosovars armed forces, but at the moment they don't seem to care about what's cooking in those latitudes: Macedonia, Albania, It's Bosnia, precisely, Kosovo represents the arc imagined by Türkiye (NATO member, it is good to remember this) to leverage neo-Ottomanist instances promoted by various NGOs, political organizations and religious institutions driven by Ankara, already protagonists of a massive sponsorship of Jihadism in the Balkan area.
The Albanian authorities could find an excellent ally in Ankara's aims, not only from an ideological point of view, but also economical. All these factors should give pause for thought, in the first place, the European Union. At the beginning of the 90s the West, taken by the dissolution of the USSR and the war in Kuwait, lowered the level of guard, underestimating the sociopolitical situation of Yugoslavia. Must prevent the terrorist extremism of the Islamic State, the Libyan crisis and the war in Syria contribute to distracting us, deluding ourselves into thinking that the history of the Balkans can stop at the Dayton agreements.
(Of Emilio Bangalterra)
SOURCE – https://oltrelalinea.news/2019/03/03/balcani-ieri-oggi-e-domani-intervista-a-giannicola-saldutti/