by Ilaria Bifarini

But when the burden of Italian public debt was created? It all starts in 1981, in which an epochal event occurs, which acts as a watershed in the history of Italian economic sovereignty: the famous divorce between the Bank of Italy and the Treasury. With an almost univocal act, that is, a simple letter to the then governor of the Bank of Italy, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Andreatta puts an end to the government's ability to monetarily finance its deficit. Removing the obligation then in force on the part of Palazzo Koch to purchase government bonds issued on the primary market, the Bank of Italy abandons its role as lender of last resort.

From now on, to finance its public spending, Italy must tap private financial markets, with the consequent explosion of interest rates compared to those previously guaranteed. But not only that: the mechanism for placing government bonds is reviewed, introducing the so-called «marginal auction price», which allows financial operators to purchase securities at the lowest price among those offered e, Therefore, at the highest interest rate. For example, if during an emission of 50 billion BTPs, 40 are awarded at a yield of 3%, while the remainder al 5%, in the end all 50 billions will be awarded to 5%!
Spreads and public debt: they are now part of our lives, we hear about it all the time, obsessively, so much so that we worry more about youth unemployment at unlikely levels and a lack of growth that is now ferrying us from crisis to recession. Yet public opinion has so internalized the market-centric narrative of the mainstream that it does not seem to believe anything else: we were spendthrift and irresponsible (PIIG) and we must therefore atone for our sins with the right amount of rigor and discipline. Therefore austerity is the right – and only – way to go, as desired by the dogmatic approach of the neoliberal economic model, the Thatcherian «tina», there is no alternative. We have a public debt around 130% of GDP, second in the EU only to that of Greece, therefore we deserve the condition of being specially monitored by Brussels and therefore to be defrauded of our autonomous fiscal policy (we have already been deprived of the monetary one). It is the path indicated by "virtuous" Germany, example of discipline and respect for the rules for us Italians, so dissolute and even a little immoral.
The effects are as disastrous as they are immediate: the amount of debt, that in 1981 it was around 58,5%, after just three years it doubles and in 1994 arrives at 121% of GDP. As reported by Andreatta himself a few years later, this structural upheaval was necessary to safeguard relations between the European Union and Italy, and to allow our country to join the EMS, i.e. the precursor agreement of the Euro system. When Italy entered the Euro it did not meet the public debt parameters required by Maastricht, but political interest and the artificial general enthusiasm for his participation prevail. It will be the crisis of 2008 to bring out all the limits and bankruptcy of a non-optimal and unsustainable currency area like the Eurozone: Italy, like other countries, without the possibility of resorting to exchange rate devaluation, fails to catch up. The public debt, which until now had been in a downward phase, passes by 102,4% al 131,8% of the 2017. Remarkable growth, but greatly reduced when compared to the increase in public debt of other countries in the Euro area, like Spain, Portugal and France itself.

In the same time frame, Indeed, Madrid saw its public debt skyrocket 38,5% al 98,3%, which means an incremental rate of approximately 150%! The crisis has not spared neighboring Portugal either, which reached a debt level very close to ours last year (125,7%), starting from a «content» 71,7% of the 2008. Yet the two Iberian countries have repeatedly breached the infamous constraint 3% – a parameter as axiomatic as it is unfounded –, thus allowing the economy to grow again, unlike the Italian one which has embarked on the destructive path of austerity. Similar situation for France, with a value of public debt at the outbreak of the crisis lower than 70% and which today is around 100%, but without this preventing it from increasing public spending and the budget deficit, thus ensuring GDP growth. So, synthesizing, our infamous public debt is higher, but he started from a clearly disadvantaged situation, and it grew in percentage terms completely in line with the trendto the other Euro countries following the crisis; On the contrary, even less than others, as we have seen, and aggravated by austerity policies, whose depressing effects on the economy are clear. The problem of interest rates remains (hence the infamous spread), higher here than elsewhere, precisely because of the methods of the government bond placement mechanisms introduced following the epochal divorce between the two Italian financial institutions.
It has been estimated that in thirty years we have paid the colossal figure of 3 trillion in interest on the public debt! In these circumstances, Italy's fiscal efforts are worthless, which has been recording a primary surplus for almost thirty years, that is, that situation, completely antisocial, so the state collects more than it spends, excluding interest on public debt. To burden the cost of debt, that is, that absurd creation of money from money, financial resources are taken away for public services and support for populations in difficulty. So, a reverse redistribution, from citizens to financial markets. The time for reforms cannot be postponed.