Mosca, 30 Dec – As far as the Russian political-state elite has decided tactically, dal 2000 to date, to moderately reintegrate Russian civilization into the global market sphere, the model of civilization that advances with Putinism, as we have already had the opportunity to specify, it is of substance neo-traditional and “social-orthodox”, that is, based on a Sobornost' expressed in the sense of moral and social communion, absolutely non-atomistic and non-individualistic, model of civilization that constitutes, among those present, the greatest ideological and cultural challenge to the liberal democratic Anglosphere. For some decisive reasons, first among these the political translation of Solzhenitsyn's worldview implemented by the new all-Russian elite from 2000 to date, the anti-Westernism of the Federation is, from a spiritual and “metaphysical” point of view, much stronger and more present than in the past Soviet Union.
We mean to refer to the inauguration, in Moscow, Taganka neighborhood, on December 11th 2018, of the statue of Alexander Solzenicyn (1918-2008). On this historic occasion, the Russian president not only identified, in the presence of the writer's widow Natalya, in Solzhenitsyn the archetype of the Russian Patriot in 1900 but he also considered Solzhenitsyn's conception of man the political barrier, the Catechon against all forms of Anglo-Saxon Russophobia, present or future. Of that, moreover, we already had news thanks to L.'s biography. Saraksina dedicated to the great Russian writer, as Putin was bluntly described as the political disciple of the master Solzhenitsyn. And indeed Solzenicyn, which quite superficially is described by Western intellectuals as the symbol of anti-communism, from the end of the 70s onwards, with the famous Harvard speech (A world shattered), he ended up considering Western Anglo-Saxon liberalism as extremely amoral and inhuman, much more than Sovietism. So Solzhenitsyn is a Russian fascist, as various Western analysts began to write from then on, including Bettanin e, albeit with reservations, S. Romano? It is, Perhaps, because in the 1970s he released a statement in which he defined the original state model of Spanish Falangism as the archetype of the traditionalist state? No, almost certainly not. Solzhenitsyn's worldview is based first and foremost on his very particular reading of Russian history, da cui emerge sia la critica radicale al modello zarista “occidentalista” di Pietro il Grande (1672-1725), sia la critica della storica sottomissione del patriarcato di Mosca allo Stato, sottomissione estranea alla tradizione ortodossa che, da San Giovanni Crisostomo a San Gregorio di Palamas e poi al metropolita Filippo di Mosca di fronte ad Ivan Grozny (1530-1584), ha sempre difeso l’indipendenza spirituale della Chiesa e il suo stesso dovere di portare giustizia e verità nel campo sociale (Cfr. Solzenicyn, Lettera al patriarca). Le varie “rivoluzioni borghesi” e democratico-massoniche sono viste come una felice, ed inconscia,discesa negli inferi del materialismo e del trionfo dell’anti-Uomo. Non può nemmeno essere detto, Solzenicyn, un nazionalista tout court in quanto nazionalismo, nel dibattito politico russo, presupposes a precise characterization of an ethnic-racial nature, social darwinist. Solzhenitsyn in fact considered the Bolshevik regime to be essentially Western and the result of a precise political-economic plan of Anglo-Saxon Freemasonry (G. Buchanan, Lord A. Milner e la Round Table, Rhodes), Trotsky himself in his memoirs makes explicit reference to loans from English financiers since 1907; and in Two Centuries together, Ours openly writes that, throughout the civil war, the English presence in Russia stood out for its sabotage of the Whites' action and for its support, not even hidden, to the Bolshevik Reds.
There will be even clearer evidence of this in the writings of the 1990s, in which the Western-style liberal-democratic regime that the oligarchs had imported into Russia is considered by us in no uncertain terms "the orgy of evil" and the anti-human, with a soft totalitarianism, That, precisely because it is soft, it is actually more pernicious and harmful than the communist one. Solzhenitsyn remains a remarkable man, of rare elevation, son of the "mystical theology" of the Eastern Church, very difficult for Western intellectuals; He emerged from Stalin's gulags in the first half of the 1950s and was terminally ill with cancer, He mysteriously heals by treating himself: “When I arrived in Tashkent, that winter, I was almost a corpse. That's why I went there: to die…For me healing was aimless: at thirty-five, that spring, I didn't have a single person in the whole world who was dear to me....Yet having ten years of prolonged meditation behind me, I already knew that truth according to which the authentic taste of life does not come out in great things, but in the small ones" (cfr. Solzenicyn, The right hand). From the day of his mysterious and completely unexpected recovery he dedicated his life to the Russian Idea: “I live for her, I only listen to his pain, I'm only talking about her...". His saddest years, will tell later, they are those of forced exile, in a West that doesn't appreciate it, years of distance from his homeland Russia and of very painful melancholy; although he remains a fierce opponent of the Soviet regime, in various letters sent at that time, knowing that he was being read and constantly spied on by the KGB, writes: “This is my most ardent desire: live in Russia, work for Russia. Let them kill me quickly, but let them bury me in Russia at least...".
In the Harvard speech (8 June 1978) which, as said, stunned Western intellectual elites, to the point that since then Solzhenitsyn's message has been substantially silenced throughout the Anglosphere, he indicates the metaphysical catastrophe of the West in a laconic way: “the decline of courage”. The rhetoric of freedom, of human and civil rights, the more or less authentic humanitarianism with which the media constantly assaults souls has a precise root in the West, in the lack of courage, absence of moral and spiritual courage. The Russian man is strong, fruit of a "spiritual school", Western man, Instead, son of bourgeois enlightenment, it would be corrupt in its foundations. Solzhenitsyn says in that context: “No, I could not recommend your company as ideal for ours. Through the intense suffering our country has faced in this century, it has achieved such an intensity of spiritual development that the Western system does not seem attractive to us at all.".
Solzenicyn, in conclusion, although he is linked to the 19th century Slavophile school, he is an Orthodox traditionalist; the Christ that he conceives is the Logos of the origin, the heroic and terrible Pantocrator, regal and solar cosmic figure, very little "democratic" and ecumenistic. In Voices from Under the Rubble, in the mid-1970s, he appeals to the Russian elite that is formed on the fire of sacrifice, beyond communism/anti-communism. For the Russian Idea. He celebrates, in various social writings, small village communities, especially rural, towards which, as known, Stalin's forced collectivization used the harshest iron fist and the logic of total extermination, “classy”, as the custodians of the original Russian spirit. Thanks to Putinism, these small communities have come back to life. Putinism is therefore the political stepchild of this climate, of vigorous neo-traditionalist and spiritual ideological reaction, more than conservative, to democratic liberalism. Nobody, nel Samizdat, not even Solzhenitsyn, could never have imagined that the rebirth of a traditionalist and Orthodox Russia, at times neo-Soviet but certainly anti-communist, which the "Dissidents" of the traditionalist right theorized in documents that were then illegal would have been carried out by a political elite raised in the Soviet school of the KGB.
Francesco Rossini
source – https://www.ilprimatonazionale.it/cultura/solzenicyn-oltre-gli-stereotipi-un-padre-spirituale-della-nuova-russia-99647/
