Of Fabio Falchi

The care of Alessio Mannino per www.vvox.it
Another (and deeper) point of view. It's that, at least compared to the "Mattarellians" of Italy, but without being aligned with the "anti-mattarellians" regardless, that he can give sine ira ac studio just a scholar, libero, far from academies and cliques, with a robust baggage of references that are not exactly mainstream, and who knows how to argue. This is the case of Fabio Falchi, 52 years, independent researcher who lives in the province of Varese, one of many (but not many) thinkers of an Italy accustomed to bringing thought to the masses, content to see the usual four "opinionists" parade by. In particular, Falchi deals with geopolitical analysis and political philosophy, collaborating on various magazines (especially “Eurasia”) and writing several books (“The inner space of the world”, the two volumes of “Politics and war” and “Community and conflict”, all published by Anteo, and another one is about to come out, which «should be titled “Geo-politically man inhabits”»). Falchi moves in the wake of «non-Marxist socialism, focused on the defense of "differences" and community bonds, as I believe that "being with others" (which can also turn into "being against others", as history shows) is the destiny of man and that consequently we cannot free ourselves, but together". Not exactly the perspective of liberal individualism, In short.
First of all, what is your opinion as an observer on the outcome of the elections of 4 March and the agreement between M5S and the League from which the famous "contract" laboriously emerged?
The electoral law with which we voted was wanted above all by the Democratic Party and FI to prevent the M5S from winning the majority of seats in Parliament, since it was clear that the Democratic Party would suffer a heavy defeat. In particular, Berlusconi's objective was to create a centre-right coalition that would win the elections and to present himself as the guarantor of the interests of the "Euro-oligarchs", building a dam against the so-called “populists”, that is, not only against the M5S but also against Salvini's League. The agreement between FI and the League was therefore not based on a shared program (so much so that the differences between the League and FI both on the issue of the EU and on other issues, like that of pensions, they were evident to anyone even before 4 March), but rather on electoral calculations. However the ballot boxes, contrary to Berlusconi's expectations, they did not give the centre-right a majority in Parliament and rewarded the League more than FI.
Berlusconi is therefore the real loser?
Berlusconi's strategy, who was also aiming for an agreement with Renzi to put Salvini in a corner, it thus proved to be a complete failure, while the M5S and the League itself could count on strong popular support precisely on some shared points, in particular with regard to hostility towards the Democratic Party and the revision of the European treaties. The alliance between the M5S and the League, who together hold the absolute majority in Parliament, it was therefore in a certain sense dictated by the same "political logic". Of course there are differences, also notable, but the common points between the two political forces have made it possible to overcome their differences and formulate a government program that is completely compliant with current laws. Now it remains to be seen whether this alliance will last.
After Mattarella's decision and Cottarelli's appointment, the discussion focused on the constitutionality of this step, which led to cries of a coup d'état. It's like this?
Democracy is a political system that allows the opposition to govern as long as it respects the laws in force. The point is, however, that laws are interpreted. Our Constitution (formal) in any case, it does not foresee that the President of the Republic will be able to reject the program of the political forces that hold the majority in Parliament. You can oppose the choice of a minister for reasons of "moral unworthiness", based on the article 48. However, he cannot refuse for political reasons to appoint as minister someone who has the task of implementing the program of the political forces that won the elections. Moreover, and the constitutional provisions (although not all) than international treaties, they can be modified following the procedures established by the Charter and the treaties themselves. Vetoing Savona's name only for his political ideas, very critical of Germany and the EU itself, and rejecting the yellow-green program, practically the will of the "markets" and the "euro-oligarchs" was put before popular sovereignty, even if exercised within the limits and forms of the Constitution.
Democracy was therefore at least suspended?
However, if some jurists believe that our material constitution allows the President of the Republic to pose this veto, then our material constitution is radically undemocratic, since the President of the Republic could act against the "letter" of the article 1 Cost. or as if the Italian republic were a presidential republic. In short, Mattarella's decision is a political act, as he himself essentially admitted, and it must therefore be evaluated and judged from this perspective, non (solo) under that of the so-called "juridical science" (which is not an exact science and it is known that you can always find a jurist who says the opposite of another). Be that as it may, it is now clear that in the West the state of exception has become the "norm" and that, as anyone who has read Carl Schmitt knows, the legal system always depends on a “political decision”.
As an analyst of world geopolitics, how the current Italian political moment fits into the global scene?
The question is complex and to answer it fully I can only refer to my essay "Community and conflict". Here we can observe that the abnormal expansion of finance is, as Braudel writes, the signal of the autumn of the hegemonic center (the USA today) and the birth of anti-hegemonic centers of power (or at least potentially so), such as Russia, China etc. That is, it marks the beginning of a multipolar phase, which opens new spaces to subdominant centers (including Germany). It is a phase characterized by geopolitical chaos and multiple contradictions that provoke pure struggles between dominant forces (“Trump effect”) and between dominants and subdominants, for example among the “Trump group” (let's call it that) and Germany, to whom much has been granted (euros included), in order to weld it to the Atlantic pole after the disappearance of the USSR, in a context dominated by predatory capitalism that has re-imposed itself in Europe since the 1990s. And for easily understandable reasons, The EU leaders are more linked to the "Clinton group" and the US deep state than to Trump's. The action of the "markets" therefore depends on this geopolitical chaos partly due to the emergence of new powers on the world chessboard. Nonetheless, the clash at the top of the USA and that between Washington and Berlin could favor Italy. If Germany had acted from a European perspective rather than from a "mercantilist" perspective (to understand each other), Today, however, everything would be different. Moreover, Germany is a commercial power but a geopolitical and military dwarf. And this matters too, how important is it that it did not oppose NATO's expansion towards the East. He acted, as usual after Bismarck (tough but capable), in a crude and obtuse way from a political-strategic perspective. Now, however, it seems that all the problems are coming to a head.
What are they, or rather who I am, the "markets"?
“Markets” are entities, apparently supranational, fragile as such but for this very reason they are "hooked" (just like multinationals) at the top of the public power of the hegemonic state or of some sub-dominant states. From this point of view it is obvious that they act according to a logic that is not merely economic but political-strategic. Indeed, capitalism, which moreover was born in Italy in the 15th-16th century, it is also characterized by the alliance between those who hold the means of coercion (and persuasion) and who holds the main means of production and the greatest financial resources, or between a hegemonic state (particularly Holland, then England and finally the United States) and the economic and financial potentates. Therefore, if you don't pay attention to the geopolitical level that is above the "markets" (which coincides with what Braudel defines as “countermarket”) and which sees financial potentates acting "in synergy" with the heads of public power in some states, we will never be able to understand how the predatory capitalism of the hegemonic center operates (i.e. the USA) and other subdominant power centers (primarily Germany today).
Euro yes/euro no seems to have become the dilemma of Italian politics. Distinguishing the level of principle and ideas from that of reality and their feasibility, believes that Draghi is right, in fact, when it considers the single currency irreversible, at least in the short to medium term?
There is nothing eternal on earth! However, the EU is not a geopolitical hub nor a truly large geo-economic space. It is not a federation nor a confederation. Nor do the Eurocrats take into account that Europe is characterized by three different geopolitical areas: the Baltic one, the Danube one and the Mediterranean one. There is no European defense, nor a European foreign policy, nor a European economic policy. France makes its foreign policy (of a neocolonialist nature), Germany makes its economic policy, Eastern European countries go their own way and so on. In practice, the EU depends on the United States from a geopolitical and military point of view and on Germany from an economic point of view. In this context it is clear that the most serious problem to be solved is that of the political architecture of the Union (the result of a thousand compromises) and that it is a very fragile political entity. And perhaps this also explains the exceptional barrage against the yellow-green army, which does not seem at all as decisive and aggressive as the newspapers portray it to be, almost as if a change to the architecture of the EU was enough to bring down the entire European edifice. The problem of the euro therefore depends on the problems deriving from the lack of an authentic European geopolitical pole. The issue to be resolved is primarily not a technical issue but a political and geopolitical one. Therefore, the question of the euro should also be posed from this perspective. That is, we should take note that a European federal state, at least in this historical phase, it is mere utopia and that the EU can survive or, Better, be truly "fair and supportive" only if the different identities and interests of the countries that compose it are taken into account.